In his day, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon used to rely on Ehud Olmert to be his canary in a coal mine. Olmert was dispatched to test the winds to see if Sharon's ideas for change would live or die.
Olmert was the first one to float the idea of shutting down Israel's settlements in the Gaza Strip.
Now that he is prime minister, Olmert may be relying on Vice Premier Haim Ramon to do the same thing.
With Olmert's apparent blessing, Ramon has been working behind-the-scenes with the Palestinians on the framework for a deal the Israelis hope can be presented at the Bush administration regional meeting later this fall.
Today, Israel's Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper presented the working outlines of the proposal. The story, in full, is below. But here's the basic idea:
Israel would use the separation barrier as the de facto border of its country, a move that would allow it to formally annex the largest Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Ramon estimates this would allow Israel to take between three and eight percent of the West Bank land, though other estimates suggest Israel could take up to 11 or 13 percent of the West Bank land.
In return, Israel would modify the route slightly and offer Palestinians a one-for-one exchange of land. For every West Bank acre Israel takes, it would offer an acre of land in Israel. Israel would give up land to establish a link between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
On Jerusalem, Israel would agree to give up its claims East Jerusalem neighborhoods dominated by Palestinians. These areas could in theory then become the official capital of a new Palestinian state.
In the Old City, each religion would have control over their own religious sites and no national flags would be flown there.
On Palestinian refugees, Israel would allow at most a symbolic return of Palestinians who fled their homes in what is now Israel.
"I am trying to persuade the other side to lower their expectations, not increase them," Ramon told Haaretz newspaper.
The idea faces a lot of challenges. The right of Palestinians to return to their homes inside what is now Israel is just one major hurdle. The plan also completely ignores Hamas and its control of Gaza.
There are some who view the Ramon plan as little more than a public relations ploy to prop up Olmert and his pragmatic Kadima party.
"There is no possibility at this time of making peace with the Palestinians," said Kadima lawmaker Otniel Schneller, a conservative West Bank settler who was tasked by Sharon and Olmert with drafting a now dormant unilateral plan to shut down settlements in the West Bank. "First we have to make peace among ourselves."
Schneller has his own revised plan,which is mostly a revamp of the Bush administration road map.
It envisions a phased approach to establishing a Palestinian state, but gives Israelis the right to vote against any element of the plan as it moves forward.
Schneller told Ma'ariv newspaper that Israel must hold onto at least 13 percent of the West Bank land.
"Without this, there will be civil war," he said.
That is probably overstating things more than a little bit.
Still, it is clear that there are still those in Israel who view the Bush regional summit as a chance to push things forward or, at least, offer the appearance of momentum, even if it goes nowhere.
Yedioth Ahronoth (p. B2) by Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer
Haim Ramon is the dove that Ehud Olmert sends to the Palestinians with an olive branch in his mouth. Ramon has a plan, whose details we will bring below. He is convinced that he is acting with permission and authorization. The Prime Minister’s Bureau says he has permission, but not authorization. That everything he proposes is at his own initiative. If it works, somehow, for Israel and the Palestinians, the Ramon plan, retroactively, will become the Olmert plan. If it doesn’t work, it will be Ramon’s alone. This technique is known in diplomatic language as deniability.
Ramon is not just proposing, he is proposing a lot. He has held a number of talks on the details of his plan with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who responded enthusiastically, if not to the details, then to Ramon’s embrace, and with other high-ranking people in the West Bank. Ramon also presented his plan to Director of Egyptian Intelligence General Omar Suleiman in a meeting in Cairo in August.
Ramon proposes formulating a document of principles, two pages long, which for the first time in the history of the conflict, would set an agreed-on and binding basis for the essence of a comprehensive arrangement. He also talks to the Palestinians about what will happen on the ground, what Israel will do and what they will do after the signing ceremony in Washington.
The document of principles would go deep into the four core issues of the conflict: the borders of the Palestinian state, security, Jerusalem, refugees. Ramon is convinced that his plan provides an answer both to Olmert’s political needs and to Abu Mazen’s political needs, each and their electorate.
Ramon tells the Palestinians that the moment Israel built the separation fence, it determined its border in the West Bank. The border would be the fence, with certain changes. This means that 3% to 8% of the West Bank would be annexed to Israel, including the Jewish neighborhoods and settlements built in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
This means, says Ramon, that Ariel and Maale Adumim would be annexed to the State of Israel, but Karnei Shomron and its satellites, Beit El, Ofra, the Haredi town of Tel Tziyon and all the settlements on the mountain ridge would be evacuated and given to the Palestinians.
The Palestinians would be compensated for the territories they lost with identical territory inside the Green Line. Ramon talks to the Palestinians about a land corridor between Gaza and Hebron. The width of the corridor would be decided based on the size of the area that Israel would receive for the settlement blocs. The Israelis would pass either under or over the corridor. In the past, Tzippi Livni proposed giving the Palestinians a tunnel connecting Gaza to Hebron, and Shimon Peres proposed linking the two areas by train. Israeli public opinion will find it harder to accept a corridor of the kind that Ramon proposes.
The document meant to be signed in November would not go into detail. It would only state that the borders are to be determined based on the 1967 lines and on land swaps. “You will be able to say that you received 100% of the territory,” Ramon tells the Palestinians. “We will be able to tell our public that we included the settlement blocs, as Bush promised in his letter of April 14, 2004.”
Security: in the document of principles, both sides would promise, immediately after signing, to carry out the first stage of the road map. The Palestinians are supposed to disarm all the organizations and instate their authority over their territory, and Israel is supposed to withdraw the IDF forces from the Palestinian cities, to accept the security arrangements formulated by American Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton and to evacuate all the outposts.
Ostensibly, this is less complicated than in the past. There is no Fayyad government in Gaza. In the West Bank, it fights Hamas openly. The matter of security is no less important to it than it is to Israel, and it is offering to cooperate extensively with Israel on this matter. It is demanding that Israel dismantle the roadblocks and allow freedom of movement, but is willing to accept Israeli military activity throughout the West Bank as necessary. Fayyad knows that his government depends on the points of the IDF’s soldiers’ bayonets. If the IDF withdraws, Hamas will take its place.
Jerusalem: Ramon, in his talks, adopts the principle that Clinton outlined in January 2001: East Jerusalem would be divided between the two states. What is populated by Jews would remain under Jewish sovereignty; the parts populated by Arabs would come under Palestine’s sovereignty. In the holy basin, i.e., the Old City and its environs, each religion would be responsible for its holy places. No national flags would be flown, neither of Israel nor of Palestine.
In his talks with the Palestinians, Ramon says that immediately after signing the document of principles, Israel would transfer to the Palestinians three outlying neighborhoods in East Jerusalem: Walaje, a village south of Jerusalem that borders on the Har Gilo settlement; Sawahra, a neighborhood in southeastern Jerusalem that borders on the Judean Desert; Shuafat, near the Atarot airfield. “By transferring the neighborhoods, Israel would be making a gesture of good will, and that is just the beginning,” Ramon tells the Palestinians. To the Israelis, Ramon says that transferring the neighborhoods should only gladden them: there will be less clients for the National Insurance Institute, less of a demographic headache.
Refugees: This is the most complicated subject. Ramon tells his interlocutors on the other side. The document of principles will have to say that the right of return will be realized in the Palestinian state. Israel will not bring refugees inside its borders unless this is part of a quota and is defined as a humanitarian gesture. Ramon talks about 1,000 families, but the number could change during negotiations.
An international foundation would be established to pay for rehabilitating the refugees. Israel would be a partner in it.