Anonymous sources

McClatchy this week published a major story that revealed lots of new information about an Iranian general, Qassem Suleimani, who is the head of Iran's Qods Force, which is believed to have supported terrorist groups in Lebanon, the Palestinian areas, Iraq and elsewhere. The story described how Suleimani has tried--sometimes succesfully--to outwit the United States in Iraq, through a combination of violence, intelligence-gathering, deal-making and influence.

Not surprisingly, the story generated a lot of reader comment. Much of it fell into two categories: the story over-relied on anonymous sources; and we at McClatchy were unwittingly helping make the case for U.S. military strikes on Iran.

This post is going to deal with issue A, anonymous sources. They've been a matter of debate and dispute within journalism, and between journalist and readers, for some time - more so in recent years due to reporting scandals at the New York Times, USA Today and elsewhere. Readers, we know from surveys and comments, hate the use of sources who won't put their names on the line.

McClatchy's Washington bureau maintains a strict policy on use of anonymous sources, which you can read here. Here are the highlights:

• The information has to be newsworthy, reliable and not otherwise available. A senior editor knows the true identity of the source.
• The information must be verified, almost always by having a second independent source.
• The source must be protected because he/she would be in physical danger or face harm to his/her livelihood. Anonymity won't be granted for conjecture, opinion or personal attacks.

The truth is, sometimes it is just not possible to write stories, particularly when it involves investigative matters or national security issues, without using information from people who do not, for very good reasons, want to be quoted by name in the newspaper (and now, on the Web). McClatchy and its predecessor, Knight Ridder, which are widely recognized to have been the only mainstream news organization to have consistently questioned the Bush administration's case for war in Iraq prior to March 2003, could not have produced that award-winning body of work had we been banned from using anonymous sources. The same goes for the award-winning coverage by our colleagues in Baghdad.

As to the Suleimani story, it quoted some significant sources by name, including Iraqi Vice President Adil Abdul Mahdi; Ammar al Hakim, the son of a senior Iraqi Shi'ite political leader; and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad. We also reviewed numerous documents, including reports on Iran's influence in Iraq; Qods Force organization charts; Treasury Department listings and U.N. Security Council resolutions; and previous news articles on the subject.

But to get the whole story--and this story was in preparation for several weeks--we had to go to Iraqi officials who rightly feared for their political and personal safety if they were seen revealing inside information about a powerful Iranian general and Iran's behind-the-scenes relations with Iraq. The same was true of intelligence and counter-terrorism officials in Washington, who could be fired if their names appeared in the paper, but who had useful information to offer. As we report, we try to take our sources' motives and axes-to-grind into account and we debate the relative value of information every day, every hour.

We think the trade-off is worth it, and in this case, the use of anonymous source helped get more information into the public domain.

Why exactly is Robert Gates in Mexico City?

Greetings from Mexico City! One of the biggest perks of covering the Defense Department is an invitation to travel around the world with the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other top Pentagon leaders. So I try to never pass up an opportunity. Last week, I was invited to cover Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ trip to Mexico City, and I accepted immediately. 

A few minutes after I did, I wondered: Why exactly is Gates traveling to Mexico City?

After all, Mexico is our ally. In addition, Mexico has no troops stationed in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the U.S. has no troop presence here. Sending troops here is not even an option. Mexico still abhors the idea, even to help address modern problems like drug trafficking and other major crimes. To Mexicans, the last U.S. troops here were occupiers. 

Moreover, most issues relating to Mexico are outside the Defense Department’s lane, as Pentagon officials often put it. Gates is only the second Defense secretary to make such a trip; the first one, William Perry, was here 12 years ago.  It falls to the State Department, DEA, and Homeland Security to chiefly deal with Mexico.

I never did find out why Gates was headed here as I boarded the plane this morning. But I figured for a few days anyway, I would not write about Iraq.

As it turns out, Gates is here to build up U.S./Mexican relations, which are marred because of Iraq. Mexico, and much of Latin America, feels U.S. attention and resources have been deflected by the war. It is not something the U.S. can ignore. Not only does it share a border with Mexico, but gets roughly 8 percent of its oil from here. Lately, the U.S. has taken notice of the rumblings.

Last year, the U.S., Mexico and parts of Central America created a $550 million security agreement called the Merida Initiative, which the U.S. Congress is currently considering. It calls for money for new police equipment and for Mexican soldiers to train in the U.S. But the secretary likely will not promise Mexico anything new to address its crime and drug problems without Congressional approval.

So Gates comes here chiefly as a diplomat armed with a simple message: “We haven’t forgotten about you.”

Joe Collins responds to our story on his Iraq report

  We received a considerable response - some good, some bad, some downright nasty - to our story about a study by Dr. Joseph J. Collins of the National Defense University of the Bush administration's decision to go to war against Iraq and the planning and aftermath of the March 2003 invasion. Here's what the author himself had to say about the version of our story published in the Miami Herald, which declined to print his letter.

Joseph J. Collins

3909 Franconia Road

Alexandria, Virginia  22310

April 21, 2008

To the Editor:

The Miami Herald story about my paper ("Pentagon Study: War is a 'Debacle'," April 18, 2008) distorted the nature and intent of its subject. The paper in question, Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and its Aftermath, was not a “National Defense University” study, nor was it a “Pentagon Study.” The disclaimer on page vi of the study clearly identifies this work as unofficial and personal, not a government “report,” as you portrayed it. 

This study examines how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how the U.S. decision-making process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The implication of the Herald story was that this study was mostly about current events or future policy. Such is not the case.

The study is about reforming decision-making, not apportioning blame.  It does not "lay much of the blame" on Secretary Rumsfeld for problems in the conduct of the war, nor does it say that he "bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It does not single out "Condoleeza Rice and Stephen Hadley" for criticism, nor does it blame them for faulty decisions.

Your readers deserve a better summary of this paper than you gave them.  I urge them to download the study (www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OP5.pdf ) and read it for themselves. 

Joseph J. Collins

Professor, National War College

 

Annual Terrorism Report: No Big Changes

The State Department's annual report on terrorism, formally known as the Country Reports on Terrorism, is due out this week, perhaps as early as Wednesday.

In contrast to the rhetoric on this issue that sometimes emanates from the White House, Capitol Hill and other quarters, the State Department report is generally seen as an even-handed, sober analysis of trends and developments in terrorism for the previous year. (Although there was that flap a few years ago, when the report understated the number of terror attacks, showing a decline when in fact there had been a large increase).

We don't have this year's full report yet, but we are reliably informed that it's expected to show no big increase or decrease in the number of terrorist attacks worldwide last year. (For 2006, the National Counterterrorism Center, which supplies the data to State, reported about 14,000 terrorist attacks worldwide).

The good news in 2007: A decline in attacks in Iraq. The bad news: An increase in Afghanistan.

New U.N. envoy to Afghanistan visits Washington

  Kai Eide, the new U.N. special envoy to Kabul, will face more than the Taliban, a weak and corruption-ridden government, rampant poverty and illiteracy and the world's biggest opium poppy crop in pursuing his ambitious mission to better coordinate international aid, governance and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
  The veteran Norwegian diplomat will also have to deal with U.S. and NATO officials and commanders who may resist his vision of a new approach in which civilian aid and reconstruction efforts receive equal billing with military operations.
   "We have to bring this together, and in particular the relationship between the civilian and military," Eide said in an address today at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It can't be the military carrying out a campaign and then asking the civilians, "Where are you now."
   Most experts agree that the Bush administration and some of its NATO allies have placed way too much emphasis on the use of force - which has claimed large numbers of civilian casualties, aiding Taliban and al Qaida recruiting and souring many Afghans on President Hamid Karzai and his foreign supporters - and have not invested nearly enough time, energy or money in helping Kabul win hearts and minds through reconstruction of ravaged infrastructure and non-functional law and order system, or fighting the country's endemic crime, poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and disease.
   Eide acknowledged that bringing civilian programs into sync with U.S. and NATO military operations will be a "difficult challenge."
   But, he said he has noted in talks with American and European officials since his appointment last month "a readiness" to support his goal of improving cooperation and coordination in international civilian and military operations.
   "I do feel I have the full confidence of the international community," said Eide. "I feel I have the strong confidence of the Afghan leadership."
   He's going to need both.
   Recent reports put the level of violence in Afghanistan at or above last year, which was the bloodiest since the 2001 U.S. intervention that ousted the Taliban and al Qaida.
   NATO members have failed to fill a request for more troops, including trainers, and helicopters, and there are deep concerns that infiltration of militants from Pakistan will rise because of peace deals the new government in Islamabad is forging with Islamic extremists in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
   Eide, who I knew in Zagreb in the early 1990s as a dogged negotiator in international efforts to end the  Belgrade-backed insurrection by Croatian Serbs, is under no illusions about what he faces in Afghanistan.
   In his frank remarks, he acknowledged the poor coordination of international aid efforts in Afghanistan, the inadequacies of the Karzai government, the security challenge, rising food prices, the need for more international reconstruction funds and the graft that saps money and popular support from aid programs.
   His immediate priorities, he said, are putting more effort into rebuilding the country's police and court system, helping improve governance in Kabul and at the provincial and district levels and seeing what can be done to improve agricultural production.
   
   
   
   
   
   
 

Khalilzad: I'm not a candidate for Afghan prez

U.N. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who has hinted that he will be leaving his post later this year, is frequently rumored to be considering a run for the presidency of Afghanistan. The Afghan-born Khalilzad again tried to quash the rumors Friday, although it was something less than an iron-clad denial.

"I'm not a candidate. I'm not planning to be a candidate," Khalilzad told a questioner (who apparently hoped for a different answer) during a session at the German Marshall Fund in Washington. Khalilzad said he hopes to return to the private sector ... in a position where he could help Afghanistan and Iraq. He's been ambassador to both places.

Meanwhile, it's TGIF. A busy first week here at Nukes & Spooks. And a busy week in the world, with revelations about Syria's nuclear reactor built with North Korea's help, continued crisis in Zimbabwe, the announcement of promotions for Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, and much more.

Back Monday ... or sooner.

Joe Nye, the 'smart power' guy

Today, we're continuing our on-going seminar on foreign policy, a topic we'll likely be returning to repeatedly as the U.S. presidential campaign moves forward...

President Bush's foreign policy has obviously run into some, er, problems, what with seemingly stalemated ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran refusing to abandon its nuclear program, a global credit crunch, and rising food and energy prices. Not to mention a declining U.S. image worldwide.

Where do we go from here? This morning, the McClatchy Washington bureau heard from one man who believes he has some answers to that question: Joseph Nye, Harvard University professor, former assistant secretary of defense, and author of a new book, The Powers to Lead.

Nye is a leading proponent of using 'smart power.'  What's that? It's a combination of hard power (basically the threat or use of military force) and soft power (other tools to get what we want, including public diplomacy, negotiations and alliances, U.S. economic power, American values, etc.)

Nye acknowledges he adopted the term 'smart power' because it is more politically saleable than 'soft power,' which, if used by a political  candidate, could leave him or her open to charges of being 'soft' on national security. But that's precisely the problem Nye argues:

"We tend to think about power as hard power. I bomb you, so I'm powerful ...  The discourse in this country is truncated."

Nye--and here we must point out he served in the Clinton administration--says President Bush's post-9/11 policies that emphasized unilateralism and military force have hurt U.S. interests. (He and former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, whose served in Republican administrations,  co-chaired a commission on restoring U.S. leadership through smart power. They testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning).

Nye said the Bush administration has slowly come around in its second term to realizing that the United States must use all the tools it has to advance its interests, not just military ones. He cited a November speech by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who called for an increase in the State Department budget. (Yes, you read that right, the Pentagon chief called for more State Department spending).  There should be, Gates said, "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development."

Leadership, Nye says, is about knowing when to use which kind of power. Going forward, he recommended that the next president-elect announce even before taking office that he or she will close the Guantanamo Bay prison and take initiatives on issues of global concern such as climate change.

Finally, Nye says Barack Obama's candidacy for president has captivated foreign publics, and has helped America's image "even if he doesn't win."

The road to Iraq begins at West Point

Greetings from the United States Military Academy, or West Point, where I had the great honor to speak to the graduating class with Tom Brokaw and Lt. Gen. William Caldwell IV, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  The students are weeks away from graduating, and in all likelihood, less than one year away from combat duty.  And our job was to do whatever we could to somehow arm with advice that will help them thousands of miles from here.  It was daunting, but inspiring as well. They were truly impressive.

On the way here, the Pentagon announced that Gen. David Petraeus will move to U.S. Central Command, Gen. Raymond Odierno will become the new Iraq commander and Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin will remain as the No. 2 there. Throughout the day, I discovered the military was reacting in very different ways. As I boarded the plane from Washington, pundits, military experts and commanders alike were debating what the changes would mean for the Iraq mission, the future of military leadership and so on.

But at West Point, professors were boasting. The three commanders were all graduates of USMA's Department of Social Science. Not only that, they were classmates. Petraeus was from the Class of '74, Austin the Class of '75 and Odierno was a Class of '76 graduate.

No one had a clear answer about how the department of those years produced today's military leaders in Iraq. But the question spurred an interesting discussion. The guess around here is they were the among the first post-Vietnam students to arrive in West Point, that is, they were among the first tasked to fixing a military drained from that war. And when many of their classmates left in the '90s during the days of a shrinking military, they stayed, worked their way up and became nexus of today's military leadership. But why all social science majors? Perhaps, one professor here pondered, it's because that major, with its classes about politics, international relations and economics, suits those interested in counterinsurgency.

Is U.S. global power declining?

This is a touchy subject, and will no doubt generate plenty of agitated debate, but here goes...

Folks in the "think tank" world, as well as several high-brow magazines, are debating whether the United States' global power is shrinking. The United States will remain a major economic, military and political power for decades to come, these analysts argue, perhaps even the predominant global power. But relative to other nations and groups, its power is dimming.

In other words, the world of the lone superpower, which lasted roughly from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 until now, is over.

Richard Haass, who served both President George W. Bush and his father, launches the latest salvo in this debate in an article in the new issues of Foreign Affairs magazine. Haass argues that the world is about to enter the "age of nonpolarity." This requires a quick detour into international relations theory:

* Bipolarity - That's when there are two major powers on the globe. Think Washington and Moscow in the Cold War.

* Unipolarity - One nation (and its allies) dominate. That was the post-Cold War world.

* Multipolarity - There are several or many "great powers." That describes the Colonial Era of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

In the world of "nonpolarity" that Haass describes, no one country or group is in charge. "Power is now found in many hands and in many places," he writes. U.S. power, Haass argues, is being challenged not just by rising nations like China and India, but by new power centers which are not even nations: terrorist outfits like al Qaida; nonprofits like the Gates Foundation; media outlets like al Jazeera; and inter-governmental groups like the International Monetary Fund.

This is not just Bush-bashing, although Haass says the Iraq war has contributed "to the dilution of the United States position in the world." He also faults a generation of U.S. energy policy (or lack thereof) that has left American dependent on oil imports.

Curiously, the rising power of states like China could push the United States and European Union together.

Germany's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, gave a speech at Harvard University on April 12 arguing for a broadened trans-Atlantic agenda that would include dealing with issues like climate change, the downsides of globalization and the resurgence of political Islam.

"No single nation can solve these problems on its own – not even the most powerful, not even the United States," Steinmeier said. His unstated message: in this uncertain world, countries that share values such as democracy need to stick together.

For another article arguing that U.S. power is in decline, click here.

Tomorrow:  An introduction to "smart power."

Will Petraeus change Iran policy?

Nancy Youssef sends this on today's Central Command announcement:

The naming of Army Gen. David Petraeus, the top Iraqi commander, to head U.S. Central Command and Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, Petraeus' deputy, to become the new Iraq commander suggests that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wants the counterinsurgency strategy the two men have championed to define U.S. relations in the region that Central Command oversees. That includes, among other nations, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq.

The appointments come at a precarious time, both in Iraq and the region. Petraeus’ surge strategy, which led to a significant drop in violence, has been in peril in parts of Baghdad after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki launched an offensive in Basra last month.

But Iran may be the bigger issue. During his congressional testimony earlier this month, Petraeus said Iran has been aggravating violence in Iraq, but stopped short of calling for U.S. military action against Iraq's eastern neighbor.

Petraeus' comments, however, were more hawkish than those of his predecessor, Adm. William “Fox” Fallon, who abruptly retired last month after Esquire published a story in which Fallon said he was standing in the way of a tougher policy toward Iran. Gates and Fallon both denied there was a rift, but Fallon said that the perception of one forced him to leave.

The appointment of Odierno as Iraq commander marks something of a redemption. He'd previously been criticized for having a ham-handed "kinetic" approach to warfare that lacked the subtlety counterinsurgency requires. His aggressive tactics against the insurgency in northern Iraq during his previous stint there are often blamed for inflaming tensions, rather than tamping them down.

But in his announcement, Gates said that Odierno had built strong relationships with the Iraqi leadership as Petraeus's No. 2 in Iraq.

Until Fallon’s retirement, Odierno was slated to be the Army’s vice chief of staff. Now that post will go to Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, who during his service in Iraq was among the first commanders to recognize that U.S. killings of innocent Iraqis had helped fuel the insurgency. "I would argue in many instances we are our own worst enemy," he told me in June, 2006.